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Abstract: Service commissions, which are claimed by Ad-Networks and Publishers, are susceptible
to forgery as non-human operators are able to artificially create fictitious traffic on digital platforms
for the purpose of committing financial fraud. This places a significant strain on Advertisers who
have no effective means of differentiating fabricated Ad-Reports from those which correspond
to real consumer activity. To address this problem, we contribute an advert reporting system
which utilizes opportunistic networking and a blockchain-inspired construction in order to identify
authentic Ad-Reports by determining whether they were composed by honest or dishonest users.
What constitutes a user’s honesty for our system is the manner in which they access adverts on their
mobile device. Dishonest users submit multiple reports over a short period of time while honest
users behave as consumers who view adverts at a balanced pace while engaging in typical social
activities such as purchasing goods online, moving through space and interacting with other users.
We argue that it is hard for dishonest users to fake honest behaviour and we exploit the behavioural
patterns of users in order to classify Ad-Reports as real or fabricated. By determining the honesty of
the user who submitted a particular report, our system offers a more secure reward-claiming model
which protects against fraud while still preserving the user’s anonymity.
Keywords: advertising; click report; fraud prevention; mobile networks; privacy-preserving advertising
1. Introduction
Digital advertising is a form of marketing which capitalizes on the popularity of digital media
Publishers such as websites and software applications in order to present consumers with promotional
material from retailers who are referred as Advertisers. Ad-Networks such as Google AdSense and
Yahoo! AdNet, operate as a middleman between Advertisers and Publishers. Their purpose is to
generate revenue by presenting users who browse a Publisher’s platform with relevant adverts of
the Advertiser’s products and services. In more detail, Ad-Networks are granted full control of
certain areas within the Publisher’s interface for the purpose of featuring adverts. When a user
accesses a Publisher’s digital domain (whether website or software application), a request is sent to
the Ad-Network who selects the most prominent advert from one of the Advertisers and displays
it along side the Publisher’s content where it may be viewed by the user. The Ad-Network then
claims a monetary reward by filing a report to the corresponding Advertiser and afterwards awards
a commission to the Publisher for providing his platform.
The ever increasing expansion of the marketing industry makes digital advertising highly
profitable for the Ad-Networks and it provides for a tenable source of profit for Publishers that
is also beneficial for users who can get services at a lower price. It should therefore come as no surprise
that according to eMarketer, the total spending on digital advertising in the US is estimated to exceed
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$77 billion for the year 2017 with most of that money being spent specifically on adverts that target
mobile users [1].
Despite being highly beneficial for all stakeholders, the Ad-Network advertising model is far
from ideal as it is susceptible to fraud. According to a report released by the Investigative Advertising
Bureau (IAB) in December 2015, the cost of digital advertising fraud is estimated to be over $8.2 billion
with 56% of that (up to $4.6 billion) being attributed to non-human traffic [2]. Ad-Networks attempt
to limit the problem through the enforcement of policy-based filtering mechanisms (which detect
suspicious traffic), but this approach has not been entirely effective [3]. The Advertisers are the
victims of the fraud and although they still benefit from digital ads, they are also forced to tolerate the
contemporary state of affairs as they have no other choice but to trust the Ad-Networks.
This research introduces an advert reporting system which utilizes opportunistic networking,
blockchain-inspired architecture and client-side processing to entirely substitute Ad-Networks with
a community of independent advert-distributors called Ad-Dealers. The Ad-Dealers have a physical
presence in publicly accessible areas and serve as anonymous communication gateways to Advertisers.
Users who appear within proximity of an Ad-Dealer are able to establish a secure connection with
the Advertisers in order to transfer information. Opportunistic networking is exploited to further
extend the reach of the Ad-Dealers over a social network of mobile users who voluntarily ferry data
for each other, while still maintaining privacy through the use of encryption. This enables the system
to propagate adverts from the Ad-Dealers to targeted users but also allows the users to anonymously
submit Ad-Reports which they compose themselves.
Although the majority of users have no immediate benefit from submitting fraudulent Ad-Reports,
this does not ensure that a filled report corresponds to real user activity. As users need to remain
anonymous, identifying dishonest (malicious) users through traditional methods such as digital
signatures is problematic. To address this limitation, our contribution is a mechanism which enables
the verification of reports that were submitted by honest users without compromising their identity.
What constitutes a user’s honesty for our system is the manner upon which they access adverts
on their mobile devices. Dishonest users commit fraud by submitting multiple fake reports over
a short period of time while honest users operate under the scope of consumers who view adverts
at a balanced pace while engaging in typical social activities. Social activities such as making online
purchases, moving through space and interacting with other users are exploited by our system to verify
that a report was submitted by a honest user. More specifically, when users perform a particular social
task (e.g., visit a designated location or meet other users) they obtain a Token which works as proof of
the user performing the action at a specific time. To better comprehend this concept, think of a game
of scavenger-hunt where players prove to have visited a location by recovering some type of artifact
from the area. In a very similar fashion, users of our system collect a series of Tokens and submit them
along with their Ad-Reports in the form of a blockchain-inspired construction which we term as the
Ad-Report Chain (ARC). Tokens work like time-stamps which allow Advertisers to calculate the rate
at which the submitted reports were composed and identify suspicious activity (dishonest users who
create large volumes of reports over short time). This results in the ability to verify that an Ad-Report
claim is the outcome of real user activity without need for knowing the identity of the particular user.
Our contributions are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, our system is the first to exploit user behavioural patterns
(Behavioural Verification) for the purpose of exposing advert fraud.
• Behavioural Verification does not need user identities and therefore preserves privacy.
• A major component of detecting fraudulent behaviour is the rate at which the use creates reports.
We simplify the process of calculating this rate compared to the literature. Traditional methods
compute this rate by filtering to identify reports that originate from the same source while the
approach that we use logs Ad-Reports in a chronological order directly at the user’s device and
submits them as a single message (ARC).
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The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 we present the scope of our research
and in Section 2 we offer insight on some of the related work in the field. In Section 3 we provide
preliminary knowledge which is required in order to completely understand the functionality of
our system. In Section 4 we provide a high level overview of our model by presenting the system’s
architecture and formalize the addressed problem. In Section 5 we provide a detailed analysis of our
system and offer insight into our approach for solving the addressed problem. Finally, we evaluate our
approach in Section 6 and state our conclusion in Section 7.
1.1. Research Scope
The scope of this research is to produce a secure advert reporting mechanism which (1) allows for
Ad-Dealers and Publishers to claim service fees from Advertisers, (2) protects all impacted stakeholders
(Advertisers, Publishers, Ad-Dealers) from financial fraud by means of preventing the forgery of
Ad-Reports and lastly (3) preserves the privacy of the users against all other parties.
2. Related Work
Online fraud is a problem that takes many different forms as expressed in [4]. In our work,
we focus on the specific area of advertising fraud which has been continuously expanding over the
past years. A number of researchers have contributed different mechanisms with the aim to combat
advert fraud. As there are many ways of approaching the issue, their work varies greatly. Some focus
on preventing fraudulent reports by detecting and blocking them at their source while others attempt
to filter out illegitimate reports by validating their quality after they have been submitted.
The Collaborative Click Fraud Detection and Prevention (CCFDP) [5] model, offers real time
click fraud protection capability through the fusion of data (evidence of suspicious behaviour) which
is provided by multiple collaborating sources. Three modules are used to independently evaluate
reported clicks from both the sever and client side and individually return probabilistic estimates of
a click’s legitimacy which are combined to produce an overall score. The results of the collaboration
are shown to improve the quality assessment of incoming traffic by an average of 10% compared to
what is separately achieved by the individual modules, thus allowing the system to identify sources of
fraudulent click more accurately and successfully block them.
Rather that filtering our fraudulent clicks, Juels et al. [6] promotes the use of premium clicks
which represent reports from users whose legitimacy can be verified through the use of cryptographic
credentials, simply known as coupons. Designated websites, referred as attestors, provide their visitors
which coupons when they perform specific tasks which are indicative of real user behaviour (e.g.,
making an online purchase). The coupon can be then attached to future Ad-Reports and works as
a form of proof that a particular click was performed by a verified user. The model is implemented in
such way that the users’ identity is substantially protected against a curious adversary and also offers
protection against coupon-replay attacks.
Haddadi [7] argues that click fraud is progressively becoming harder to detect through traditional
threshold techniques (identifying multiple reports from the same IP) as BotNet activity is becoming
evermore sophisticated through the employment of such means as proxies and distributed attacks.
To address the problem, the paper proposes the use of specialized adverts which are called Bluff-ads.
Bluff-ads operate as a from of honeypot which allures automated clickers but repels real users.
While most adverts are typically targeted at a specific user by being context-specific to a consumer’s
profile, Bluff-ads are purposely designed to be entirely irrelevant to the user’s interests (e.g., an advert
for female clothes that is shown to a male user). As Bluff-ads are of no real significance to the targeted
user, when they are being clicked may be an indicator of suspicious activity. Although we find this
idea to be very creative, we need to remark upon the fact that Bluff-ads are unlike to be adopted as
they take valuable space which can be used for real (profitable) ads.
Instead of operating on the server side, FCFraud [8] runs locally on the devices of individual
users as a means of preventing them from being part of a BotNet. A BotNet is a group of infected
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devices which is used to commit click-fraud by generating fake reports without the user’s knowledge.
The model is incorporated into the operating system as an anti-malware software which monitors
submitted click-reports to detect if they correspond to real activity (physical mouse clicks) or have been
artificially created by a malicious software. FCFraud is shown to be highly effective at recognizing
fake clicks and can easily be implemented in user devices but is only suitable for Advertisers who
adopt the PPC (Pay-Per-Click) model.
Faou et al. [9] provide a detailed examination of a click-fraud malware called Boaxxe over a long
period. The authors run Boaxxe in a controlled environment and managed to reconstruct a redirection
chain which maps the path of different domains that malware follows before been directed to the
targeted Advertiser’s website. By representing this data in a graph, they were able to identify key
actors who have a critical role in the scheme and target them more effectively with the intent of
disrupting the malware’s operation.
Security within mobile communications has received considerable attention in the context of both
cellular [10–13] and opportunistic networks [14–16].
3. Preliminaries
The Advert Distribution System (ADS) [17] that we offered in our previous work,
combines anonymous download technologies and opportunistic networking in order to deliver
adverts to users without exposing their consumer interests. The system that we present in this
paper expands the functionality of ADS by enabling users to also submit reports about the adverts that
they have viewed.
As both systems share much of the same architectural elements and stakeholders, in this section
we provide a fundamental overview of ADS which will be required in order to better comprehend
the extended advert reporting system that will be described later on. As depicted in Figure 1,
ADS establishes a communication link between Advertisers, who are retailers that wish to promote
their products and Users who represent consumers. The Ad-Dealers are local broadcasting stations
who serve as communication gateways between users and Advertisers in order to distribute adverts
upon request. The role of the Ad-Dealer may be cast to regional entities such as shopping malls,
WiFi hotspots and local businesses.
Users run a software client on their smartphone devices that allows them to connect anonymously
to Ad-Dealers within their proximity through the use of specialized networking equipment. This allows
the mobile clients to freely request and consequently download adverts which are then displayed by
Publishers who are digital advertising platforms such as websites and mobile apps.
Furthermore, users can also communicate with the Ad-Dealers indirectly through opportunistic
networking by forwarding Ad-Requests to an Agent over Bluetooth of WiFi Direct. As shown in the
diagram, the Agent physically ferries the Ad-Requests to an Ad-Dealer, collects the requested adverts
and conveys them back to the user. In practice, Agents are also mobile users who have the additional
role of propagating Ad-Requests and adverts on behalf of other users within their social community.
This setup benefits members of the community who do not visit Ad-Dealers on a regular basis but can
obtain their adverts through other users (Agents) within their social circles.
User privacy against the Ad-Dealers is ensured by the use of anonymous connections (no use
of IP address or MAC) and the fact that Agents operate as a form of partially trusted proxy between
the users and Ad-Dealers. Ad-Requests are encrypted with a public key which is incorporated into
the users’ client software and can only be deciphered by the Ad-Dealers who share knowledge of
a secret decryption key. The adverts are also encrypted by the Ad-Dealers with a key which is provided
to them by the users themselves within the equivalent Ad-Requests. This preserves the privacy of
users against Agents who have no access to the content of Ad-Requests nor the adverts and also
guarantees security against a rogue Agent who might inject malicious adverts into the network.
Security throughout the entire system is also enforced by strong authentication mechanisms as to
prevent malicious users from impersonating Ad-Dealers, Agents and other users (In our previous work,
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we provide a detailed description of how the opportunistic network is established and the mechanisms
which are employed to ensure security and anonymity. For this reason, this paper assumes existence
of a secure opportunistic link and focuses exclusively on the submission of Ad-Reports).
Figure 1. Decentralized advert distribution system over opportunistic network.
4. Model Overview
In this section, we provide a high level overview of our model. We begin by first featuring the
stakeholders of our system and detailing their functionality in Section 4.1. We then proceed to define
our adversary model in Section 4.2 by contemplating the relationships between the stakeholders in
terms of trust and potential threat which enables us to formalize the problem in Section 4.3. Finally,
we establish a list of evaluation criteria for our design in Section 4.4.
4.1. System Architecture
As previously mentioned, the advert reporting system that we submit with this work is
an extension of our Advert Distribution System (ADS) that we briefly explained in Section 3 and
therefore shares much of the same components and architecture. Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of
the system and provides a high-level overview of the system’s operation which can be divided into
three stages with each of them performed under a different sub-protocol later examined in Section 5.3.
The Users, Publishers, Agents, Ad-Dealers and Advertisers represent the same stakeholders as in
our earlier ADS system but at the same time have the added functionality of managing Ad-Reports
with the help of the Broker. The Broker assumes the role of a trusted representative of the Advertisers
to the Ad-Dealers and Publishers. As the Advertisers are too numerous to operate independently
while still remaining coordinated, they employ the services of the Broker whose job is to collect and
verify the Ad-Reports that are dispatched by the Ad-Dealers.
The user initiates the first stage that is marked in Figure 2 as (1) Report Form or RF Collection
by composing an RF-Request the purpose of which is to inform the Broker of the user’s intention to
submit Ad-Reports. The RF-Request is then sent to an Agent who operates as an intermediate node
of the opportunistic network. The job of the Agent is to physically transfer the RF-Request to one of
the Ad-Dealers, who then forwards to the Broker. Upon receiving the RF-Request, the Broker issues
a Request Form (RF) which is sent in the opposite direction: back to the Ad-Dealer, who forwards
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it to the Agent, so that it may be conveyed back to the requesting user. The RF contains necessary
information which the user needs in order to compose and submit his/her Ad-Reports later on.
The second stage, which is marked as (2) AD Collection, is essentially the same advert delivery
operation which we described in Section 3. Through the use of an Agent, the user sends an Ad-Request
message to the Ad-Dealers in order to demand specific adverts. The Ad-Dealer who receives the
Ad-Request may then obtain the requested adverts from the appropriate Advertisers and send them
back to the user via the same Agent. Note that this operation can take place multiple times via different
Agents and Ad-Dealers. Furthermore, it may also take place in combination with the first operation
(RF Collection) as one Agent can transfer both the adverts and the RF at the same time.
Figure 2. Decentralized advert reporting system over opportunistic network.
The final stage, which is noted as (3) Ad Report or AR Submission, takes place after the user has
viewed the adverts through a Publisher. To notify the Broker that the user has viewed the adverts,
the user composes Ad-Reports and forwards them to a Commissioner with the intent to be delivered
to an Ad-Dealer. The receiving Ad-Dealer shares the Ad-Reports with the Broker, who verifies their
authenticity and notifies the appropriate Advertisers. Based on the information that is provided within
the Ad-Reports, the Advertisers can eventually reward the Publishers who featured the adverts as
well as the two involved Ad-Dealers (the first that delivered the adverts to the user and the second
that submitted the Ad-Reports).
It is evident that the Commissioner serves a very similar function as the Agent. The only difference
is that the Agent ferries Ad-Requests and adverts, whereas the Commissioner ferries Ad-Reports.
At this point we must note that the terms Agent and Commissioner are designations that are given
to a user based on the type of service that they provide. Consider an example where a user named
Alice sends an Ad-Request to Bob who transfers it to an Ad-Dealer, collects the advert and delivers
it back to Alice. Alice then views the advert, generates an Ad-Report that she sends to Charlie
who forwards it to the Ad-Dealer. In this particular scenario, the Agent is Bob and Charlie is the
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Commissioner. Let us now examine a different scenario where Alice sends her Ad-Request to Danna
who collects the adverts for Alice and then Alice composes her Ad-Report that is also sent to Danna
who will deliver it to the Ad-Dealer. In this scenario, Danna serves both as Agent and Commissioner.
It is clear that there is no practical restriction in regards to who serves as Agent or Commissioner and
both responsibilities may be assumed by the same person. As to avoid any confusion, let it therefore
be noted that the term Agent is a designation that is given to the person who delivered an advert to
the user and the term Commissioner is a designation that is given to the person that delivered the
Ad-Report to the Ad-Dealer and both of these designations may be attributed to the same person.
4.2. Adversary Model
Our system regards the majority of users as honest since they have no immediate benefit nor the
necessary technical knowledge as to undermine the integrity of the system. However, it is possible
for an adversary to easily assume the identity of a user without exposing himself since the only
precondition for joining the system is to download a mobile client without revealing any identifying
information. The main adversary is any group of malicious Ad-Dealers and Publishers who may
attempt to commit fraud against the Advertisers by impersonating the identity of a legitimate user in
order to submit fictitious Ad-Reports. The Advertisers are therefore willing to accept the authenticity
of an Ad-Report only after it has been verified by the Broker whom they consider trustworthy.
The Ad-Dealers and Publishers have no reason to doubt the integrity of the Broker but at the
same time are cautious of him as he might alter the content of an Ad-Report as to deprive them of their
reword. The Broker therefore serves as a secondary adversary for the Ad-Dealers and Publishers.
One last aspect that needs to be considered is the privacy of the users that needs to be preserved.
For this reason, the user considers all other parties, including Agents and Commissioners as honest
but curious adversaries and is reluctant to share any personal information that can be associated to his
or her identity (Maintaining user privacy when requesting and receiving adverts through an Agent
is a matter that we resolved in [17] and for that reason we only focus on the delivery of Ad-Reports.
Regardless of this, we do contemplate for all privacy aspects throughout the entirely of the model and
thus our evaluation includes a section where we examine how our original advert distribution system
is effected).
4.3. Problem Formalization
Given set of Ad-Dealers D, set of Publishers P, set of Users U who submit set of Ad-Reports
AR, it should be possible for a Broker b to identify a subset of fictitious reports ÂR ⊆ AR but at the
same time it should not be possible for the Broker b , any Ad-Dealer d ∈ D or any Publisher p ∈ P to
uncover the identity any user u ∈ U nor alter the content of any ARu ∈ AR without being exposed.
4.4. Evaluation Criteria
Having considered the details of the tackled problem in Section 4.3 and after taking into account
the scope of our research in Section 1.1, we dedicate this section to compose an index of system
requirements that will serve as the criteria under which the effectiveness and security of our design
can be evaluated.
• Protection against fabricated reports A malicious user should not be able to commit fraud
against the Advertisers by submitting reports which do not correspond to real consumer
activity. Fraud prevention is the primary aim of analogous systems and therefore constitutes our
main criterion.
• Report integrity After an Ad-Report has been sent, it should not be possible for the Ad-Dealers,
Commissioners or Broker to alter its content without being exposed. In contrast to other models,
our system utilizes a decentralized architecture over insecure channels and should therefore
guarantee the integrity of transmitted data.
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• User privacy: At any given moment, the Broker, Advertisers, Ad-Dealers, Agents and
Commissioners should not be individually capable of associating a user’s advertising interests
to his or her identity. User privacy is an aspect that does not necessarily fall within the scope
of fraud prevention systems but is a major concern for our research and is therefore taken
into consideration.
• Reporting effectiveness: Ad-Reports should include all the necessary information as to ensure
that all of the participating stakeholders are able to claim their reward. The Broker should be able
to ensure that each report is accounted only once and also there should exist a way for the user to
confirm that his or her reports were delivered successfully. The effectiveness of submitted reports
is taken as a standard requirement by analogous systems but in the case of our model it needs to
be examined in more detail as it may be affected by the additional mechanisms that are used to
preserve privacy (opportunistic networks and anonymous submission).
5. Detailed System Analysis
In the following sections we provide a detailed analysis of our system and offer insight into
our approach at solving the problem of detecting fake Ad-Reports without the need for knowing the
identity of the submitting user. Our approach is based on the notion of behavioural verification,
according to which a legitimate user can be verified by his social behaviour. More specifically,
when users view adverts on their devices, they generate Ad-Reports as featured in Section 5.1.1.
At the same time the users also collect a series of Tokens when they perform certain social tasks
such as visiting specific locations or interacting with other users as explained in Section 5.2.
Both the Ad-Reports and the Tokens are composed into an Ad-Report Chain (ARC) which is
a blockchain-inspired construction that is further analyzed in Section 5.1.2.
As the ARC contains both the user’s Ad-Reports and Tokens, it can be used by the Broker to verify
that the user who created a particular Ad-Report has the same social behaviour as a legitimate user.
Furthermore, the Tokens work as time-stamps which allow the Broker to verify that the reports of
an ARC were created at a paced rate and not in bulk. The ARC can then be shared with the Ad-Dealers,
Publishers and Advertisers so that the service rewards can be claimed. Information among the system
stakeholders is shared through the use of a digital database termed as the Service Confirmation Board
(SC-Board) illustrated in Section 5.1.3. The SC-Board offers additional security mechanisms which
allow the user to confirm that his or her reports have been delivered without exposing the user’s
identity but also enables the Ad-Dealers and Publishers to verify that a submitted ARC has not been
tampered by the Broker before being published.
5.1. Information Components
In the following sections we introduce the individual informational elements that compose our
advert reporting system. More specifically, in Section 5.1.1 we specify the contents of the different types
of Ad-Reports and in Section 5.1.2 we outline the way upon which the individual reports of a particular
user can be combined into a blockchain-inspired construction that we label the Ad-Report Chain (ARC).
Finally, in Section 5.1.3 we present the concept of the Service Confirmation Board (SC-Board) that is
a medium upon which ARCs may be shared with the separate stakeholders of the system.
5.1.1. Ad-Reports
The marketing industry generates profit from online advertising based mainly on three
supported revenue models. The first and most popular is called Cost-Per-Click (CPC) advertising or
Pay-Per-Click (PPC) and is founded on the principle that a reward is attributed when a user clicks on
an advert that is displayed on the Publisher’s domain. The second most prominent model is referred
as Cost-Per-Impression (CPM) advertising or Pay-Per-Impression (PPM) and awards money when
a user simply views a displayed advert. The third revenue model is known as Cost-Per-Action (CPA)
or Pay-Per-Action (PPA) where money is awarded when users perform a specific action which is most
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typically the purchase of a product [18]. The preferences of Advertisers may not be limited to just
a single pricing model and for this reason our system can support all of them at the same time by
offering three different types of Ad-Reports as listed below.
• RoV: Report of View
• RoC: Report of Click
• RoA: Report of Action
As depicted in Figure 3, all supported Ad-Report types incorporate a sequence number N which
indicates the order in which the reports were created. The Advert Code is a unique reference number
that is sent to the user alongside each advert and can be used for identification. The DID and PID
respectively accommodate the identities of the Ad-Dealer who distributed the advert and the Publisher
who featured it to the user while the Date field holds the date and time of the publication.
Figure 3. Supported types of Ad-Reports and their contents.
The C-Token (or Click-Token), which can be found in the RoC and RoA, is a sequence of data which
can be obtained by the user when the advert is clicked. The A-Token (or Action-Token) which is present
in the RoA, follows a very similar format as the C-Token with the main difference being that it is disclosed
to the user only after a specific condition has been met (e.g., the user made a purchase or created
an account). Each Advertiser periodically generates his own C-Token and A-Token which are uploaded
within his domain. The function which is used for this operation as well as the frequency upon
which the two tokens are updated fall udder the responsibility of the respective Advertisers. Ideally,
the C-Token and A-Token should be generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator
and as often as practically possible. The rate at which the C-Token and A-Token are updated influences
the system’s accuracy of verifying the time that the Ad-Reports were created. More specifically, if the
Tokens are updated once every T time units, then the system can verify the time of a user’s report with
granularity T. It is assumed that the random number generator is secure and that the only feasible
way to obtain the C-Token and A-Token is by downloading them from the locations in which they were
uploaded by the particular Advertiser.
More specifically, the C-Token is uploaded in the same cuber-space where the user is linked to
when clicking on the advert while the A-Token is placed in the location to which the user is diverted to
when he or she performs a specific action such as making a purchase. Much like the way that web
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cookies work, the mobile client obtains the C-Token and A-Token from the Advertiser’s website and
places them within the Ad-Report as the user is browsing. This enables the Advertisers to verify that
a user accessed their website or performed a specific action before creating a RoC or RoA. Having to
obtain the tokens before creating a new Ad-Report, makes the forging of RoCs and RoA more difficult.
To forge a RoC, the dishonest user needs to visit an advertiser’s web site and to forge a RoA requires
him to perform an action. More importantly, tokens prevent dishonest users from creating fictitious
reports ahead of time as a RoC which contains a token Cn could not have been created before the
token was made available online. Lastly, h(AR(N−1)) contains a hash function digest of each previous
Ad-Report that was composed by the same user. This enables the user to link all of the reports that he
or she creates in the form of a blockchain-inspired architecture which is analyzed more minutely in
Section 5.1.2.
One last thing that needs to be mentioned is the fact that for every Ad-Report, the sequence
number N and hash h(AR(N−1)) are sent in plaintext form while the remaining fields are encrypted
with a public key BPuK which belongs to the Broker and is further clarified in Section 5.3.3.
5.1.2. Ad-Report Chain (ARC) and Integrity Hash (IH)
Rather than dealing with Ad-Reports individually as they are being created, our system enables
each user to aggregate multiple Ad-Reports throughout the course of defined period and then submit
all of them as a single unit. As it has already been explained in Section 5.1.1, each Ad-Report contains
the hash digest of the previous. This enables the user to link several Ad-Reports together in a form
that resembles the architecture of a blockchain which is termed the Ad-Report Chain or ARC for short.
As shown in Figure 4, the first block of the ARC contains an initiating value which is marked as
ARC-ID. This is hashed to produce h(ARC− ID) that is included in the second block N = 1 with each
consecutive block following the same arrangement. The h(ARC− ID) essentially works as a unique
identifier which also marks the start of a specific ARC. The ARC-ID is dictated by the Broker and sent
to the user within the RF (Report Form) as depicted in the same figure. Recall from Section 4.1 that the
RF (Report Form) is a message that comes as a response to the user’s request to file Ad-Reports.
Figure 4. Structural elements of the Ad-Report Chain.
As we can see, the RF also contains a cryptographic signing key sk. While the ARC-ID is used to
identify and mark the start of an ARC, the sk is used to mark the end in such a way that it prevents
the removal of addition of blocks. More specifically, when the user completes the creation of the ARC,
the user produces h(ARC) and then signs it with sk. The resulting message, which we can also see in
the same figure, is termed as the IH (or Integrity Hash) and is sent to the Broker along side the ARC.
Future Internet 2017, 9, 88 11 of 23
The Broker can use a secret verification key vk in order to confirm that the IH was created by the user
and then determine that the ARC has not been altered by comparing the h(ARC) from within the IH to
an h′(ARC) which the Broker computes himself.
5.1.3. Service Confirmation Board (SC-Board)
The Service Confirmation Board (or SC-Board for short) is a digital database which serves as
an information sharing platform between all of the system’s stakeholders. The indexed entries of the
SC-Board represent Request Forms that have been distributed to users and consist of five fields as
shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Service Confirmation Board architecture.
The first two fields are filled by the Broker when he issues a new RF and respectively contain the
ARC-ID and the name of the issuing Ad-Dealer (the Ad-Dealer who forwarded the user’s RF-Request)
along with the corresponding date. The remaining fields are completed when the report is submitted
with the third field keeping the identity of the submitting Ad-Dealer (the Ad-Dealer who forwarded
the user’s ARC and IH) and the date of submission while the forth and fifth contain the Ad-Report
Chain ARC and Integrity Hash IH.
Indicated in the diagram with a darker shade under the second, third and fourth field, are
certain sections which are completed by the issuing Ad-Dealer, the submitting Ad-Dealer, the Broker
and the individual Advertisers. These fields serve the purpose of verification checks. In more
detail, VC-I under the second field is signed by the issuing Ad-Dealer to verify the issue of the new
ARC-ID. In a very similar fashion, the submitting Ad-Dealer signs the third field marked as VC-S
in order to verify the submission of the ARC and confirm the correctness of the hash digests h(N)
for each block of the ARC. Recall that in Section 5.1.1, we briefly mentioned that the content of the
Ad-Reports are encrypted except for the sequence number N and hash h(N) which are still visible
to the submitting Ad-Dealer. While the ARC in the fourth section is published by the Broker after
decryption, the submitting Ad-Dealer confirms that the hashes have not been altered by comparing
them to his own copy. The individual verification checks, which are marked as VC-1 to VC-N under
the ARC, are filled either by the Broker to indicate blocks that have been verified or by the Advertisers
to indicate blocks for which the Advertiser has awarded a commission to the Publisher. More details
on the exact operation and the reasons behind it are provided in Sections 5.3.3 and 6. Lastly, we need
to mention that all fields of the SC-Board are visible to Ad-Dealers, Publishers and Advertisers but the
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first field with the ARC-ID also becomes available to the users after submission has been completed.
The users only need to have access to the first field in order to verify that their submission has been
delivered but cannot see any other information that is published on the SC-Board
5.2. Behavioural Verification
The detection of forged Ad-Reports is a challenging issue because users need to remain
anonymous, and anonymity prevents verification through traditional methods such as digital
signatures. To resolve this problem, we propose an alternative means of verifying truthful reports
while still allowing users to maintain their anonymity. Users can be classified as honest or dishonest
based on the manner upon which they create Ad-Reports. As Ad-Reports are rewarded at a low
commission (typically at around $1 per 1000 impressions), dishonest users commit fraud on a large
scale by generating large volumes of unverifiable Ad-Reports at a rate which is much higher than what
is realistically possible for a legitimate consumer. Honest users on the other hand, view adverts at
a realistic rate and therefore generate Ad-Reports in a paced manner over a longer period. While they
are composing their Ad-Reports, honest users engage in typical social activities such as purchasing
goods online, moving through space and interacting with other users. All of these social activities
are distinguishing behaviours of honest users which can be exploited to verify their honesty without
exposing their identity.
As we already described in Section 5.1.2, the Ad-Reports that are created by the same user are
linked together in an ARC. The goal is therefore to identify whether the creator of a particular ARC is
honest or dishonest. We accomplish this by embedding into the ARC certain elements (blocks) which
reveal the user’s social behaviour patterns during the time the Ad-Reports were being created.
5.2.1. Advert Association
Honest users utilize adverts as consumers and are therefore likely to not simply view an advert
but to also engage with it by clicking or making a purchase. The act of engaging with an advert can
therefore be considered as a typical behaviour of honest users but it also has to be noted that not all
honest users engage with adverts in the same rate, and some users do not engage at all. In order
to therefore avoid false positives, the system regards the engagement of adverts as an indicator of
honesty but the lack of engagement is not treated as suspicion of dishonesty. To compensate for users
who do not engage adverts, our system exploits other forms of honest behaviour as explained in the
following sections.
In Section 5.1.1, we illustrated the available types of Ad-Reports and called attention to the fact
that a RoA is harder to forge than an RoC which is in turn harder to forge than an RoV as they contain
tokens which are acquired by accessing the Advertiser’s website. The RoCs and RoAs can therefore
serve as indicators of honesty as they signify that the user took the time to visit the Advertiser’s
website. The remaining RoVs may not verifiable but they can be validated-by-association since the
ARC follows the same architecture as a blockchain as shown in Figure 6.
A limitation to this approach lies in the fact that RoCs and RoAs are designed to be used
by Advertisers who support the Cost-Per-Click (CPC) and Cost-Per-Action (CPA) pricing models.
This may limit the number of RoCs and RoAs as it excludes all the Advertisers who only support
Cost-Per-Impression (CPM). To overcome this shortcoming, our system utilizes the different types
of Ad-Reports (RoV, RoC and RoA) not based on the Advertiser’s pricing model but in accordance
to the user’s engagement with the advert. Regard a simple example where an Advertiser supports
the CPM model which means that a simple RoV would normally suffice. For the same application
however, we can also use a RoC or a RoA when the user interacts with the advert by clicking or by
making a purchase. The commission is still going to be awarded based on the viewing but the use of
a more secure Ad-Report will validate the authenticity of the claim as RoVs can be forged more easily
than RoCs and RoAs.
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Figure 6. Behavioural verification by advert association.
5.2.2. Time and Location Checkpoint
The use of RoCs and RoAs enables the identification of honest users in two ways: First, they are
indicators of a user who took the time to perform a specific action; second, the C-Token and A-Token
(which are periodically updated) can be used to determine the rate at which the Ad-Reports were
created. As not all users engage with adverts regularly enough for this method to be effective on its
own, the same principle can be extended by periodically incorporating into the ARC some form of
Time-Token (T-Token) which would signify the time that a particular block was created. One limitation
that needs to be considered however, is that this T-Token should not be obtained through the Internet,
as this would expose the user’s IP address and it would also be ineffective since a dishonest user could
commit fraud by creating multiple ARCs in parallel over a longer period of time.
To overcome this limitation, the T-Token is distributed directly from Ad-Dealers in the same way
as adverts. The correctness of the T-Token is ensured through the synchronization of Ad-Dealers which
can easily be achieved with the help of the Broker. This enables the verification of the time that a block
of the ARC was created but also operates as a location tag. Location tags are data that can be associated
with a point in space and time and have appeared in the literature before, in the context of private
(cryptographic) proximity testing in [19]. The location tag provides additional proof of the user’s
honesty as it verifies the user’s social behaviour in terms of appearing within the proximity of public
locations, where Ad-Dealers are broadcasting, such as shopping malls, cafes and WiFi hotspots.
To further comprehend this notion, consider the following example of attempted forgery. If the
T-Token were accessible online, a dishonest user û could periodically download it and use it to easily
verify set Ŝ = {ÂRC1, ÂRC2, ..., ÂRCi} of fictitious ARCs over a longer period of time. However,
when the T-Token is distributed by the Ad-Dealers, it is more difficult for û to obtain it since he or she
needs to physically travel to the location of the Ad-Dealer and request multiple copies for each of the
elements of Ŝ. Furthermore, so as not to raise suspicions, the T-Tokens would also need to be requested
at a slow rate and preferably from different Ad-Dealers which adds a supplementary layer of difficulty
for the adversary.
The T-Token is obtained and embedded into a user’s ARC as follows. When entering the vicinity of
an Ad-Dealer, the user sends the hash digest h(n− 1) of the last block in the ARC and a user-generated
encryption key UEK, both encrypted with the Ad-Dealer’s public key DPuK. The Ad-Dealer decrypts
the message with his private key DPrK and composes a Checkpoint Block (CB). As illustrated in
Figure 7, the CB contains the identity B who is the Ad-Dealer that performed the check as well as the
received hash h(n− 1) and date which are signed with a private key KB that belongs to him and is
only used for this application. The date serves as the T-Token while the signature is proof of the user’s
location. Before being sent back to the user, the CB is first encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK
and then encrypted again with the user’s UEK as shown in Equation (1):
EUEK [EBPuK [CB]] (1)
When the cryptogram is received, the user decrypts it with the corresponding UDK and obtains
the EBPuK [CB] which is given a sequence number N = n and is inserted into the user’s ARC as shown
in Figure 7 (All blocks of the ARC are encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK as to ensure privacy
against Ad-Dealers and Commissioners. The encryption on the CB could had been performed by the
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user himself but in this case is performed by the Ad-Dealer in order to relieve some of the strain from
the user’s mobile device. The Ad-Dealer can be trusted with this operation as he has no benefit from
providing a defective CB).
Figure 7. Behavioural verification by checkpoint.
5.2.3. Social Affiliation
The social affiliations between honest users is an additional behaviour which can be exploited
to verify the rate that an ARC was created. When two users meet, they may exchange the sequence
numbers N and hashes h(n) of their last blocks as well as their ARC-IDs. The two users can then verify
the date and time of the meeting by adding an Affiliation Block AB in their respective ARCs with each
others’ information. In order to be valid, the ABs which are added to the ARCs of both users need to
have matching dates and times but this does not require a perfect synchronization between the two
users. Mobile applications typically have a recommended refresh rate for adverts that is between 30 s
to 120 s while malicious applications generate Ad-Reports at a higher rate. For the purpose of detecting
fraud, the time difference between the two users can therefore be tolerant to a margin of a couple of
minutes without seriously affecting the system. In the event that two ABs do not match because one
of the users provided an unrealistically inaccurate date and time (either maliciously or accidentally),
the Broker can simply ignore it while relying on other Tokens to validate the particular ARC.
Figure 8 illustrates an example where two users A and B have added each others’ Affiliation
Blocks within their respective ARCs. The AB which was added by user B, is shown in the diagram to
contain a new sequence number n, the hash of the previous block h(n− 1), the Date of the meeting
(as registered by B) and the information that was sent by A which includes her ARC-ID=ARC1 as well
as the sequence number m and digest h(m) of her last block. The date which is added by B works as
a T-Token which verifies the last block of ARC1 at a particular time. Notice that ARC1 and sequence
number m are sent encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK while the h(m) is signed with A’s
signing key sk1 which is also used for the creation of the Integrity Hash IH as explained in Section 5.1.2.
This ensures that B does not lean any information about ARC1 and is not able to alter h(m).
Through the exchange of ABs, the Broker can infer that two ARCs were submitted by affiliated
users but this does not compromise user privacy in any way. The ARCs are submitted anonymously
and the Broker has no means of obtaining any information about a particular user’s social network nor
is he able to identify ARCs that were submitted by the same user. One limitation of this verification
method lies on the fact that a dishonest user may exchange ABs between multiple fictitious ARCs.
Although plausible, this is prevented by combining all three verification methods as discussed in the
following Section 5.2.4.
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Figure 8. Behavioural verification by social affiliation.
5.2.4. Combined Verification
The individual methods of behavioural verification have certain limitations as the social affiliation
approach in Section 5.2.3 is susceptible to fraud by means of creating multiple fictitious ARCs while
the methods which are described in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 may not always be practically feasible as
they require the user to regularly click on adverts or travel to certain locations.
To compensate for each others’ limitations, all three approaches were designed to work in
combination. In the example which is provided in Figure 9, user A submits an ARC which
contains multiple Ad-Reports that need to be verified (marked in the figure with exclamation marks).
The honesty of A is supported by the fact that his ARC also contains a verifiable report (either a RoC or
a RoA), a Checkpoint Block from an Ad-Dealer and two Affiliation Blocks.
Figure 9. Extended diagram of behavioural verification.
Furthermore, we see that the respective ARCs of the two users X and Y who provided ABs for
A also have verifiable reports, CBs and AB from other users such as Z. As all submitted ARCs show
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indications of social activity, it serves as significant evidence to support the notion that they were
composed by different honest users rather than a single dishonest one. For reasons of simplicity,
the example just described features only a few verification credentials. However, in a more realistic
scenario, the users would likely have multiple credentials which would solidify their verification.
5.3. Protocol Description
The system comprises of three sub-protocols which correspond to the three stages of the system’s
operation (1) Report Form Collection, (2) AD Collection and (3) Ad Report Submission that were
mentioned in Section 4.1. The sub-protocols run sequentially and are detailed in the following sections.
5.3.1. Report Form Collection Sub-Protocol
The Report Form Collection sub-protocol that is depicted in Figure 10 is run when the user needs
to acquire a new Report Form.
1. The user calculates a pair of asymmetric keys UEK and UDK. The encryption key UEK is composed
into an RF-Request and the decrypton key UDK is temporarily stored.
2. The RF-Request is encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK and sent to one of the Ad-Dealers,
either directly or via an Agent.
3. Upon receiving the RF-Request, the Ad-Dealer forwards it to the Broker.
4. The Broker decrypts the RF-Request with his private key BPrK and obtains the user’s encryption
key UEK. The Broker then creates an entry in the SC-Board with a new ARC-ID and the identity of
the issuing Ad-Dealer and afterwards computes a pair of keys sk and vk. The Verification Key vk
is stored securely while the Signing Key sk and the ARC-ID are composed into a Request Form RF.
5. The RF is first encrypted with the UEK which was provided by the user and then is returned to
the issuing Ad-Dealer who filed the request.
6. The issuing Ad-Dealer verifies his identity on the SC-Board by providing this signature.
7. The Ad-Dealer forwards the RF to the user either directly or via the same Agent who delivered
the original RF-Request.
8. The user receives the encrypted RF and decrypts it with his UDK in order to obtain the ARC-ID
and vk.
Figure 10. Report Form Collection sub-protocol.
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5.3.2. Advert Collection Sub-Protocol
The Advert Collection sub-protocol that is depicted in Figure 11 is used for the acquisition of
adverts and may run multiple times as needed.
1. The user computes a pair of asymmetric keys U′EK and U′DK. The user stores the decryption
key U′DK and then composes an Advert Request Message (ARM) which contains the encryption
key U′EK and his advertising interest (referenced by known interest identifies that are common
throughout the system).
2. The ARM is encrypted with a public key DPuK and sent to one of the Ad-Dealers, either directly
or via an Agent.
3. The responding Ad-Dealer decrypts the ARM with the corresponding key DPrK which is kept
private among all the Ad-Dealers who use the system and obtains U′EK as well as the user’s
advertising interest.
4. The Ad-Dealer determines which specific adverts would best suit the needs of the user and files
a request to the appropriate Advertisers.
5. Upon receiving the Ad-Dealer’s request, the Advertisers respond with the adverts in plain form.
6. The Ad-Dealer aggregates all of the received adverts into an Advert Delivery Message ADM.
7. The ADM is first encrypted with the U′EK and then returned to the user either directly or via the
same Agent who delivered the original ARM.
8. The user receives the decrypts the ADM with his U′DK in order to obtain the adverts which are
stored for future use by the Publishers.
Figure 11. Advert Collection sub-protocol.
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5.3.3. Ad Report Submission Sub-Protocol
The Advert Collection sub-protocol that is depicted in Figure 12 is used for the delivery of Advert
Reports by the user to the Broker.
1. The user gradually composes his or her reports into an ARC as he or she is interacting with
adverts. The contents of the ARC are encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK except for the
first block that contains the ARC-ID and the sequence number N and hash digest h(N − 1) in all
remaining blocks. When the ARC is ready for submission, the user produces an Integrity Hash IH
by computing h(ARC) and signing the result with the signing key sk which were delivered to
him with the sub-protocol described in Section 5.3.1.
2. The ARC and IH are sent to one of the Ad-Dealers either directly or via a Commissioner.
3. The Ad-Dealer keeps a local copy of the ARC and IH.
4. The Ad-Dealer submits the ARC and IH to the Broker.
5. The Broker first decrypts the ARC with his private key BPrK and verifies the authenticity of the
IH with the matching verification key vk. The Broker then verifies the integrity of the ARC by
replicating the results of the hashes h(N − 1) in the individual blocks as well as the digest of
h(ARC) that is found in the IH. When verification has been completed successfully the Broker
uploads the ARC and IH onto the SC-Board in plaintext form. Finally, the Broker verifies the
validity of the Checkpoint Blocks CBs and Affiliation Blocks ABs and Marks them on the SC-Board.
The CBs are validated by checking the authenticity of the Ad-Dealers signature with a public key
which is used only for this application. The ABs are validated by checking the signature (which
exploits the sk’ of the second user who participated in the meeting) and by cross referencing the
dates in both the ARCs (if the other ARC has already been submitted).
6. When the ARC and IH have been uploaded to the SC-Board, the Broker notifies the submitting
Ad-Dealer with a Check Message.
7. The submitting Ad-Dealer verifies the hashes in the uploaded ARC and IH by comparing them to
his own copy (recall that the hashes were not originally encrypted). The submitting Ad-Dealer
then confirm the correctness of the ARC by placing his name and signature in the third field of the
SC-Board.
8. The Broken notifies the Advertisers for the new entry in the SC-Board.
9. The Advertisers begin to reward the Publishers and Ad-Dealers and each reward report of the
ARC is marked on the SC-Board by the appropriate Advertiser. Each Advertiser is responsible
for individually determining the honesty of the user who submitted the ARC by assessing
the embedded authentication credentials which have been marked (CBs, ABs, RoCs and RoAs).
The RoCs and RoAs are validated and marked on the SC-Board by the respective Advertisers after
conforming the contained C-Tokens and A-Tokens. Depending on the number and significance of
credentials in the ARC, the Advertisers may choose to award a report or wait for more credentials
to be marked on the SC-Board (more awarded RoCs and RoAs by other Advertisers and more
confirmed ABs).
10. After a certain time has passed from the submission of the ARC, the user’s mobile client checks
the SC-Board in order to determine that his or her report has been registered. If the matching
ARC-ID is present within the SC-Board, the user may discard his or her original copy of the ARC
and IH or else resubmits them. Recall that the only part of the SC-Board which is visible to the
user is the ARC-ID while the rest is kept private among the remaining stakeholders.
Future Internet 2017, 9, 88 19 of 23
Figure 12. Ad Report Submission sub-protocol.
6. Evaluation
We follow a qualitative approach to evaluate our work by scrutinizing the performance of our
system against the evaluation criteria that we established in Section 4.4. The goals are (1) to determine
the effectiveness of our model at delivering accurate advert reports, (2) assess the system’s resilience
to fraudulent behaviour which is targeted against both the Advertisers as well as the Ad-Dealers
and Publishers, and lastly (3) to evaluate the effectiveness of the system at preserving the privacy of
the user.
6.1. Reporting Effectiveness
Reporting effectiveness is defined as the system’s capability to deliver the necessary information
which is required by the Publishers and Ad-Dealers (as a substitute of the Ad-Network) to claim their
rewards from the Advertisers. As we do not process the data of Ad-Reports beyond encrypting and
decrypting it, the information delivered by our system is the same as in the currently deployed system.
In that regard, our system offers a similar reporting effectiveness in terms of the quality of information
which it supports. In addition to this, our approach allows for the acquisition of supplementary
information about the social habits of consumers. By matching the ABs (Affiliation Blocks) within
the ARCs (Ad-Report Chain), the Broker would be able to deduce the consumer interest similarity of
users that belong in the same social cycle. Furthermore, the Broker can also infer correlations between
adverts, Publishers and locations (e.g., users who view adverts of product A are also interested in
product B or users who visit location X tend to view adverts through Publisher Y). This offers a very
useful insight into consumer practises which is obtained without violating the user’s privacy by
tracking his or her IP address.
As ARCs are shared on the SC-Board under specific ARC-IDs. This ensures that all stakeholders
have access to them and that the same Ad-Report is not rewarded more than once. Moreover,
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the SC-Board allows partial access to users which enables them to detect when an ARC has not
been delivered on time and may need to be resent, thus increasing the system’s robustness.
Although participation is voluntary, the privacy that the system provides is a good incentive for
attracting users.
6.2. Fraud Protection of Advertisers
Financial fraud against the Advertisers is the main shortcoming of the currently enforced model
that we address with our work. The main perpetrators of fraud are BotNets (automated clickers)
and Click Farms where low-paid workers are hired to click on adverts. Such schemes commit fraud
by generating a large bulk of Ad-Report traffic that does not correspond to actual consumer activity.
To combat this problem, our model enables the affected stakeholders (Advertisers, Publishers and
Broker) to (1) calculate the rate upon which a user creates reports and (2) verify that a user has the
same behavioural patterns as a typical consumer.
To illustrate the system’s protection against fraud, we will examine an attack scenario where
a dishonest user Û attempts to commit fraud at a large scale by submitting a set Ŝ = {ÂRC1, ..., ÂRCi}
of fictitious ARCs. Recall that an ARC contains the following types of blocks: RoV (Report of View),
RoC (Report of Click), RoA (Report of Action), CB (Checkpoint Block) and AB (Affiliation Block).
Among all types of reports, the RoV is the easiest to fabricate as it does not contain any verifiable
information (Tokens). However, Û cannot submit an ÂRC which only contains RoVs as this would be
immediately rejected by the Broker. The RoC and RoA contain a C-Token (Click-Token) or an A-Token
(Action-Token) which can only be obtained by visiting the Advertiser’s website within a particular
time-frame. This prevents Û from creating RoCs and RoAs ahead of time but Û can still attempt to
commit fraud by creating the ÂRC over a longer period of time. Although this makes the creation
of the ÂRC more difficult, it is still possible with the use of an automated process that automatically
downloads the Tokens when they become available. Despite this fact, the ÂRC would still be rejected
by the Broker as it would not contain any CBs or ABs.
Recall that CBs are distributed by Ad-Dealers and include a T-Token (Time-Token) which is signed
and cannot be forged without knowledge of a secret cryptographic key. In order to obtain valid CBs,
Û would need to repeatedly travel to the physical location of an Ad-Dealer throughout the course of
the creation possess of the ÂRC. Moreover, the fraudster must be cautious not to request multiple CBs
(for different ÂRCs) at the same time as this would provoke suspicion. Even if Û were to conspire with
one of the Ad-Dealers, the ÂRC would still be in danger of being exposed due to the disproportionate
number of CBs from just one source. For such an attack to be successful, the fraudster would need to
conspire with multiple Ad-Dealers and manage the CBs in a way that does not create an observable
pattern (e.g., multiple ÂRCs containing CBs from the same group of Ad-Dealers). Provided that the
Ad-Dealers are carefully selected, such a scenario would be unlike.
The ABs are exchanged between users and serve a similar purpose as CBs as they can be used to
determine the rate in which the reports were created. In contrast to CBs however, the T-Token which
is contained in ABs is not signed by an Ad-Dealer but by another user. This makes ABs vulnerable
to forgery as Û can exchange ABs between multiple fake ÂRCs. However, if the fraudster was to
compose a ÂRCs in such a manner, suspicions would still be raised by the Broker due to the lack of
CBs, RoCs and RoAs.
To conclude, in order for Û to fabricate ÂRCs which are realistic enough to fool the Broker,
Û would need to use an automated process which downloads C-Tokens and A-Tokens over an extended
period of time. During that time, Û would need to exchange ABs between the ÂRCs and also physically
collect CBs from different Ad-Dealers without raising their suspicion by submitting multiple requests
at the same time. This process is time consuming and impractical which makes the conduct of financial
fraud more difficult to accomplish.
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6.3. Report Integrity
After an ARC leaves the user’s device, it has to go through a Commissioner, an Ad-Dealer and
the Broker before finally being posted on the SC-Board (Service Confirmation Board). This makes it
possible for any of the intermediaries to commit fraud by altering the content of an ARC. This type of
fraud would be particularly difficult to detect due to the fact that a legitimate ARC (one created by
a real user) is likely to have valid Tokens. Our system prevents this attack through the employment
of hash functions and verification checks. To demonstrate the operation of the integrity mechanism,
we will consider two attack scenarios.
Attack scenario 1:
The Commissioner and the submitting Ad-Dealer attempt to alter the content of a legitimate ARC
in order to trick the Broker and Advertisers into rewarding a malicious Publisher for a publication that
did not take place. Recall that the ARC follows the architecture of a blockchain where the first block
holds a unique ARC-ID and each following block includes the hash digest of the previous. Additionally,
the user also sends an IH (Integrity Hash) that contains the hash digest of the entire ARC which has
been signed with a verification key vk.
Since the content of the Ad-Reports is encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK, it would
be possible for a malicious Commissioner or Ad-Dealer to create a fictitious Ad-Report of his own.
However, if the fictitious Ad-Report were to be inserted into the ARC (either as a new block or by
replacing an existing one), this would result in a mismatch of both the hash digests within ARC’s
blocks as well as the hash digest that is included in the IH. The attacker would be able to change the
hashes in the ARC but cannot change the hash in the IH without knowing the user’s verification key
vk which was delivered to the user within the RF (Report Form). The RF was encrypted with a key
that the user selected himself and only shared with the Broker via his public key BPuK. This makes it
impossible for an attacker to alter the content of IH without being exposed.
Attack scenario 2:
The Broker attempts to alter the content of a legitimate ARC in order to cheat a Publisher out of
a reward. Although the Broker can be considered trustworthy as the representative of Advertisers,
our system allows the Ad-Dealers and Publishers to verify that there has been no tampering of
the Ad-Reports.
Recall that Ad-Reports are encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK and are shared on the
SC-Board (Service Confirmation Board) after they have been decrypted. The Broker could therefore
attempt to cheat the Ad-Dealers and Publishers by altering the Ad-Reports of a submitted ARC before
uploading it to the SC-Board. To prevent this attack, the submitting Ad-Dealer holds a copy of the ARC
before forwarding it to the Broker. Although certain parts of the ARC are encrypted with Broker’s
public key BPuK, the hash digests are transferred in plaintext. This allows the submitting Ad-Dealer to
replicate the hash functions on the posted ARC in order to verify that decryption has been completed
correctly. The submitting Ad-Dealer then marks the verification check VC-S in the SC-Board which
informs the Publishers and remaining Ad-Dealers that the submitted ARC is valid.
6.4. User Privacy
User privacy is ensured through the application of encryption, anonymous connections and the
employment of Agents and Commissioners who serve the role of partially trusted proxies. The Advert
Request Message (ARM) which is sent by the user to request adverts is encrypted with the Broker’s
public key BPuK. The requested adverts are placed in an Advert Delivery Message (ADM) that is
encrypted with an encryption key U′EK which was provided by the user within the ARM. This ensures
that the Agent who serves the user has no access to neither the requests nor the ads. Similarly,
the Ad-Reports of the user’s ARC are also encrypted with the Broker’s public key BPuK which ensures
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privacy against the serving Commissioner. The Broker does not learn the identities of the user,
the Agent or the Commissioner as the exchange of information takes place over an anonymous
connection. The same anonymous connection is also in place when the user collects a Checkpoint Block
(CB) from an Ad-Dealer within his or her proximity. The request is encrypted with the Ad-Dealer’s
public key DPuK and contains a user-generated encryption key UEK which is used by the Ad-Dealer to
transfer the CB. This ensures that an eavesdropper cannot gain access to the user’s information nor
spoof the identity of the Ad-Dealer in order to transmit a fake CB.
7. Conclusions
Digital advertising allows Advertisers to effectively target users with promotional materials and
at the same time offers a sustainable source of income for Publishers. Advertising fraud however,
presents a serious threat for the marketing industry as it is costing Advertisers billions of dollars
every year. The attempts of Ad-Networks to contain the problem by filtering incoming traffic has
had limited effectiveness against BotNets and Click-farms who employ various methods in order to
remain undetected.
In this paper, we address the problem by contributing an alternative reporting method
which filters Ad-Reports by determining if they were composed by honest or dishonest users.
What constitutes a user’s honesty is the rate at which they create Ad-Reports. While honest users view
adverts at a paced manner over a longer period, dishonest users (whether BotNets or Click-farms)
generate large volumes of reports in a short amount of time. The challenge that we face is the need to
protect the user’s anonymity which prevented us from simply verifying real users through traditional
means such as digital signatures. To overcome this limitation, our approach identifies honest users
based on their behavioural patterns. Typical social behaviours such as making online purchases,
traveling to specific locations and engaging with other users are exploited by our system in order
to allow users to collect a series of digital credentials which we call Tokens. The Tokens work as
proof that the user who collected them was engaged in a specific social activity (e.g., traveling to
designated location) at a particular time. When combined with Ad-Reports in the form of an ARC
(Ad-Report Chain) which follows the same architecture as that of a blockchain, the Tokens operate
both as time-stamps which give us the ability to determine the rate the reports were created at but
also offer proof that the creator has the type of social activity which is indicative of an honest user.
The Tokens do not include any identifying information and the ARC is then delivered through the use of
opportunistic networking and anonymous connections which ensure the user’s privacy. This enables
Advertisers to validate multiple reports which are composed by the same user without the user’s
identity being exposed. The combination of effective Ad-Report verification and user anonymity
offers a well-balanced solution where both the Advertisers and users achieve their goals without one
of them needing to make a compromise. Our method of verifying users based on their behaviour
creates a promising alternative to verification methods which involve tracking and therefore violate
the user’s privacy.
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